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RAILROADS DAMAGES UNDER. EMPLOYERs' LIABILITY Ac:r UsE oF ANNUITY PAYMENTS UNDER. RAILROAD RETIREMENT Ac:r IN
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES* A recent decision 1 raised the question

of the right of a railroad defendant, against whom suit had been
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act of I908,2 to
plead in mitigation of damages plaintiff's eligibility for an annuity
under section z(3) of the Railroad Retirement Act of I937.8 The
court, holding that plaintiff was not eligible for an annuity under the
provisions of the Retirement Act, found it unnecessary to pass on the
issue. It is proposed in this comment to suggest and analyze the more
important arguments on which the solution of the problem, left undecided by that decision, will hinge and to determine, as far as possible,
the probable course of judicial action when a determination of the
question shall be required.
I.

In a broad sense the issue raised is not entirely new. Since I86o~
the courts have been grappling with various aspects of the problem
that arises whenever a defendant seeks, in mitigation of damages, to
prove that plaintiff's injury was alleviated by the receipt of services
or pecuniary benefits conferred on plaintiff because of the injury for

*The writer is indebted to Paul R. Bro,vn, of Fuerst & Brown, Cleveland, Ohio,
for helpful suggestions in the preparation of this comment, though the responsibility
for the comment is the writer's. An analysis of the problem suggested by this comment,
arriving at the opposite conclusion, will be found in an article by George Gildea of
Katzenbach, Gildea & Rudner, Trenton, New Jersey> published in the April 1938
issue of the Raibvay Association Bulletin.
1 McCarthy v. Palmer, (D. C. N. Y. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 585.
2 35 Stat. L. 65> 45 U. S. C. (1934), § 51 et seq.
a 50 Stat. L. 309, § 2 (a), 4S U.S. C. (Supp. 1938)> § 228b (a): "The follo,ving-described individuals ••• shall ••• be eligible for annuities after they have ceased
to render compensated service to any person•••• (3) Individuals, without regard to
age, who on or after the enactment date are totally and permanently disabled for
regular employment for hire and shall have completed thirty years of service,"
'Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355 (1860), probably represents the earliest recognition of the problem.
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which he is demanding damages. Almost without exception this plea
has been denied. Thus, evidence that the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries, had received benefits from either life 6 or accident 6
insurance policies has been, without exception, rejected by the American courts. In all but four states mitigation of damages has been refused
although plaintiff, while disabled, had received all or part of his salary.7
And, under the American rule, defendant has not been allowed to
prove in mitigation of damages that plaintiff had become entitled to
pension payments as a result of the injury.8
On the basis of a. fourfold analysis of the legal relationships existing
between the parties, the Vermont court, in an early case,° refused to
admit evidence of payments under an accident policy as grounds for
mitigation of damages. Determining that the defendant and the insurer were neither joint tort feasors nor in legal privity, the court
held that payment by the insurer could not discharge the defendant
from his obligation as a. wrongdoer. Accordingly, the court concluded,
payments on the policy were collateral to the remedy against defendant
and if, as asserted, plaintiff should be restricted to a. single recovery,
the defendant, and not the insurer, would be primarily liable. Subsequent decisions have rephrased these observations,1° _but the essential
6 The cases dealing with this problem are, collected and annotated in 67 L. R. A.
87 at 92 (1905); 18 A. L. R. 678 (1922); 22 A._ L. R. 1558 (1923); 95 A. L. R.
575 at 577 (1935). The rule is further discussed in 8 AM. & ENG. ENcYc. LAw,
2d ed., 690 (1898); 8 R. C. L. 554 (1915) ; 17 C. J. 929 (1919); 15 AM- Jcm.,
615 (1938). For application of the rule under the Employers' Liability Act, see
Brabham v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) 220 F. 3S·
6 See authorities cited in note 5, supra.
T Under the New York-Alabama rule, receipt of salary bars any recovery for loss
of time. Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N. Y. 390 (1880); Travis v. Louisville & N.
R. R., 183 Ala. 415, 62 So. 8Sl (1913). Under the Pennsylvania-Missouri rule, such
payments are available for mitigation unless paid as a gratuity. Quigley v. Pennsylvania
R. R., 210 Pa. 162, 59 A. 958 (1904); Moon v. St. Louis Transit Co., 247 Mo.
227, 152 S. W. 303 (1912). An excellent discussion of the prevailing doctrine and the
minority rules will be found in Motts v. Michigan Cab Co., 274 Mich. 437, 264
N. W. 855 (1936). Cases are collected and annotated in 67 L. R. A. 87 at 89 (1905);
18 A. L. R. 678 (1922); 22 A. L. R. 1558 (1923); 95 A. L. R. 575 at 580 (1935).
8 Cases collected and annotated in 67 L. R. A. 87 at 94 (1905); 18 A. L. R.
678 at 689 (1922); 22 A. L. R. 1558 (1923); 9S A. L. R. 575 at 580 (1935).
The leading case is Geary v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 73 App. Div. 441, 77 N. Y. S.
54 (1902). The rule is discussed in 3 SHEA~IAN and REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE, 6th
ed., § 765 (1913). The English courts, following Baker v. Dalgleish Steam Shipping
Co., [1922] 1 K. B. 361, have reached the opposite result.
9 Harding v. Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1871).
10 Subrogation was relied on by Pack, J., in Harding v. Townshend, 43 Vt. 536
at 539 (1871), when he said: "It would seem to be a perversion of justice to subrogate the wrongdoer who has caused the loss, to the rights of the injured party as to
his remedy against the insurer." Other courts have relied on the concept that defendant
must pay for all the damage he had done, regardless of what plaintiff receives. Thus in
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principles have been developed, without substantial change, into the
so-called "collateral source doctrine," 11 most comprehensively expounded by Miller, J., in Clark v. Berry Seed Companty: 12
"The weight of authority is conclusive to the effect that a defendant owes to the injured compensation for injuries, the proximate
cause of which was his own negligence, and that the payment by a
third party cannot relieve him of his obligation; that regardless
of the motive impelling their payment, whether from affection,
philanthropy or contract, that the injured is the beneficiary of the
bounty, and not the defendant who caused the injury."
As a corollary to this doctrine it is apparent that where the defendant was actually the source of the benefits, mitigation of damages
should be allowed. Thus it has been held that a defendant could show
in mitigation of damages that he had paid the plaintiff's medical expenses 18 and, in an action by a. landlord against his tenant for destruction of leased property, that the defendant had purchased insurance
on the property, which had been paid to the plainti:ff.u
Which of these two correlative principles should control where the
plaintiff has received, or is eligible £or, an annuity under the Retirement Act depends upon the construction to be given that act when
construed along with the Carriers Taxing Act.16 The Taxing Act provides the source of the pension funds of the Retirement Act 18 by
levying, on all employees' salaries up to $300 per month, an income
tax on employees and an excise tax on employers varying from 2¾
per cent in I937 to 3:¾4 percent in r948.1T Whileat:6.rstglance such payTubb v. Lief, [1932] 3 W.W. R. (Sask.) 24-5 at 24-7, it was said that "the fact that
the plaintift' has provided against accident and is entitled to certain benefits from an
insurance policy in the event of accident or sickness occurring does not dimish the wrong
done him by the accident, nor the liability of the wrongdoer to pay for such wrong."
Still other courts have emphasized the argument that though plaintiff may not be entitled to more than one recovery, defendant is not in a position to raise the question
since it is primarily liable for the injury. Harding v. Townshend, supra; Cunnien v.
Superior Iron Works Co., 175 Wis. 172, 184 N. W. 767 (1921).
11 For text and digest discussions of the rule, see: 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES,
4th ed.,§ 158 (1916); 8 Al'.1. & ENG. ENCYC. LA.w, 2d ed., 690 (1898); 8 R. C. L.
SS4 (1914); 17 C. J. 929 (1919); IS AM. JuR. 615 (1938) and cases there cited.
For discussions by courts, see: Regan v. Ne\V York & N. E. R. R., 60 Conn. 124, 22
A. 503 (1891); Roth v. Chatlos, 97 Conn. z82, n6 A. 332 (1922).
12 226 Iowa 262 at 271, 280 N. W.
(1938).
13 Goodwin v. GioveneUi, n7 Conn. 103, 167 A. 87 (1933).
u Publix Theatres Corp. v. Powell, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 71 S. W. {2d) 237.
1 " SO Stat. L. 435 (1937), 45 U. S, C. (1938 Supp.), § 261 et seq.
115 Alton R. R. v. Railroad Retirement Fund, (D. C. D. C. 1937) 16 F. Supp.
955.
17
St:it. L. 437, §§ 2, 3 (1937), 4-5 U.S. C. (1938 Supp.), §§ 262, 263.
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ments would seem clearly to indicate that.defendant was the source of
the benefits and should, therefore, prevent application of the collateral
source doctrine, at least one plausible argument has been advanced
which leads to a contrary result. This argument was suggested in
Overland Construcuon Co. v. Sytlnor,18 wherein the court, holding
that the collateral source doctrine precluded mitigation where medical
expenses were paid by the Ohio Industrial Commission out of funds
to which defendant had contributed, said "such payments are not, in
reality, paid by the employer but by the ultimate consumer as a cost
of production." 19 Whether this argument is to be considered justifiable
or so tenuous that it is little more than a. rationalization,2° having as its
sole value circumvention of the rule which precludes utilization of the
collateral source doctrine, will depend ultimately upon the court's
determination of the intent of Congress and the policy that motivated
the legislation. If, as a result of this decision, the approach suggested
in the Overland case is• adopted, defendant's plea must be denied; if it
is rejected, defendant will have overcome only one of the hurdles
which stand in the way of sustaining the plea. These questions of intent
and policy, for reasons of convenience, the writer proposes to consider
in detail as a separate section. Suffice it, at this juncture, to say that
back of the determination of congressional intent will lie the court's
reaction to the broad policy dilemma that to allow mitigation will enable the defendant to use the humanitarian provisions of the Retirement Act to exculpat~ its own wrong, while to refuse mitigation will,
in effect, enable the plaintiff to recover double compensation for a single
injury.

z.
Section 5 of the Employers' Liability Act 21 provides:
"That any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the
purport or intent of which ·shall be to enable any common carrier
to exempt itself from any liability created by this Act, shall to
that extent be void: Provided, that in any action brought against
any such common carrier under or by virture of any of the pro-·
visions of this Act, such common carrier may set off therein any
(C. C. A. 6th, 1934) 70 F. (zd) 338.
Ibid., p. 340.
11D Carried to its logical conclusion, the doctrine of the Overland case would not
preclude mitigation. If the ultimate consumers are considered the source of the annuities, there is no reason why it should not also be recognized that they are the
source of damage payments under the Employen' Liability Act; this being true, the
consumer is the source of both the annuity and damages and the collateral source
doctrine should not preclude mitigation. For this analysis of the Employers' Liability
Act, see the opinion of Rogers, D.J., in Fulgham v. Midland R. R., (C. C. Ark.
1909) 167 F. 660 at 663.
21 35 Stat. L. 66, 45 U. S. C. (1934), § 55.
18
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sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or
indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the
person entitled thereto on account of the injury or death for which
said action was brought."
This section, while undoubtedly inserted primarily to protect employees
from being forced into contracts waiving their rights under the act,
and secondarily to allow relief benefit arrangements,22 appears to be
sufficiently comprehensive to include within its scope the problem here
under consideration. If mitigation is to be allowed, it is because the
employee has been indemnified, in whole or in part, by the receipt of
an annuity; and, under the terms of section S, once this is established
the employer is entitled to no more than a set-off for his contribution.23
In response to this, however, it may well be argued that the section
should not be applied in the field of railroad employees' annuities under
government regulation, as such payments were clearly beyond the
contemplati9n of Congress when the section was enacted.u This argument has been held by the Supreme Court of Illinois 25 of sufficient
weight to prevent cumulation of payments due under the State Workmen's Compensation Act and damages, otherwise assessable, under
the Employers' Liability Act. Again determination of Congressional
intent must determine which argument should prevail. If the provision
is given a broad construction, the employer is entitled, at most,211 to
set off his contribution under the Taxing Act; if, on the other hand,
the rule applied by the Supreme Court of Illinois prevails, defendant
will have overcome another potential legal obstruction to his contention.

3.
When confronted with a new problem involving the interpretation
of apparently conflicting statutes, courts often place reliance· on the
'"This problem is annotated in 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 198 (1907); II L. R. A.
(N. S.) 182 (1908); 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 38 at 50 (1914); 48 L. R. A. (N. S.)
440 (1914). See also Wise v. Chicago, B. &: Q. R. R., 133 Minn. 434, 158 N. W.
7II (1916).
23 Bangor&: Aroostook R.R. v. Jones, (C. C. A. 1st, 1929) 36 F. (2d) 886.
2 ' The Jirst act of this type was the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, declared
unconstitutional in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct.
758 (1935).
25 Staley v. lliinois Cent. R. R., 268
356, 109 N. E. 342 (1915), reversing
186 DI. App. 593 (1914). It was held that, as the Employers' Liability Act was passed
in 1908 and the first ,vorkmen's compensation act was passed in 1910, Congress could
not have intended to include payments thereunder within the proviso of section 5.
211 In McCarthy v. Palmer, (D. C. N. Y. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 585 at 588, even
this was denied defendant. Moscowitz, D. J., said: "the contributions, upon the basis
sought to be set off, have relation to the age provisions of the Act and there 1s no
nexus between the purpose for which the contributions in this regard were made and
the purpose for which damages in this negligence action are awarded."
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doctrine that the legislators are presumed to be cognizant of the
istence of prior enactm.ents.21 Thus a court, compelled to decide the
problem presented in this comment, might well hold that Congress,
knowing of the existence of the Employers' Liability Act when the
Railroad Retirement Act was passed, had it desired to limit recovery
under the former, would have done so by explicit provisions. Again,
however, an equally convincing argument may be advanced in favor
of a. contrary holding. Section 8 of the Employers' Liability Act provides: 28
"That nothing in this Act shall be held to limit the duty or
liability of common carriers or to impair the rights of their employees under any other Act or Acts of Congress.•.."

On the theory that Congress is c~gnizant of prior enactments, a
court wishing to allow mitigation might well hold that Congress, knowing of the existence and effect of section 8 of the Employers' Liability
Act when it was considering the Retirement Act, had it desired to
prevent mitigation, needed only to include a. similar section in the
new act. From this premise it would follow that Congress, by its
silence on this problem, meant to imply that normal rules of mitigation
of damages should control whenever the two statutes affected the same
situation. Once more either of two equally plausible arguments may
be accepted; which shall prevail will, of necessity, be determined by
judicial inferences of Congressional intent.

4.
Section I2. of the Retirement Act provides that: 29
"No annuity or pension payment _shall be assignable or be
subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal
process under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment
thereof be anticipated."
This section presents what appears to be the strongest technical
argument against allowing defendant's plea. The obvious purpose of
the section was to prevent subjecting the employee to the loss, by any
method or under any circumstances whatsoever, of the benefits that
Congress sought to bestow upon him. To allow these funds to be used
in mitigation of damages by deducting their present value from plaintiff's recovery, it might well be argued, amounts to anticipation of payments-clearly prohibited by the terms of this section. Yet an analysis
of plaintiff's case could, without doing violence to realities, be held to
21' 2 SUTHERLAND, STA.TOTES AND STATUTOR.Y CoNSTRUCTION, 2d ed., §§ 355,
4-47 (1904).
28 35 Stat. L. 66, 45 U. S. C. (1934), § 58.
29 50 Stat. L. 316, 45 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), § zzSL
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show that he in no way seeks either to subject the annuity to legal
process or to anticipate its payment. Merely using as evidence the
present value of an annuity does not in fact anticipate the annuity;
it merely shows the proper deduction to be made at this time and the
plaintiff is left to collect his annuity when it properly becomes payable.
Again, whether the court will reject the evidence, on the ground that
it is an attempt to anticipate an annuity, or, looking to the purpose for
which it is offered, will admit it, will depend upon the solution of the
underlying question of Congressional intent.

5.
Recognizing, then, that the courts will be able to :find substantial
arguments on either side of the question, what are the fundamental
matters of policy involved, and how should they be resolved? Reduced
to a single issue, the entire problem revolves around the interpretation
to be given to the purpose of the Retirement Act and in particular
section 2(3).30 If the purpose of this section is to compensate the
employee for his total disability, then, unless mitigation is allowed, he
will have received double compensation for a single injury and, despite the argument that such mitigation will allow a wrongdoer to
escape the effect of his act, defendant should be granted the relief
prayed.31 If, on the other hand, the sole object of the Retirement Act
is the solution of the sociological problem presented by the employee
who, having worked out his health and strength by reason of many
years of service in a. hazardous occupation affected with a public interest, is unable, without some type of retirement benefit, to retain a decent
standard of living, then section 2 (3) must be construed as merely extending such benefits to a particular class of employees, and the funds
so secured should not be available for the reduction of the liability of
a tortfeasor.
Keeping in mind the prevailing political and economic theories of
Congress at the time of the enactment of the Retirement Act,32 it
would seem clear that it was the latter policy which motivated its passage. This position is made more tenable when it is realized that to
construe section 2 (3) as a provision for liab~lity would result in compensation without regard to fault where an employee, after thirty
years of service, was totally and permanently disabled, while normal
Quoted at note 3, supra.
This result is made inevitable by the interpretation given the Employers'
Liability Act by Cain v. Southern R. R., (C. C. Tenn. 19n) 199 F. 2n at 212,
in which it was held that damages were assessable only on a compensation basis,
''excluding all consideration of punitive elements, loss of society, wounded feelings of
the survivors and suffering of the deceased."
HTo the effect that such elements may be considered, see 25 R. C. L. 959,
1035 (1919).
30
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rules of tort liability, supplemented by a doctrine of comparative negligence,38 prevailed throughout the rest of the apparently homogeneous
field. That there is no reason for such a differentiation, it is submitted,
is a sufficient basis for its rejection.
In summary, it is the writer's opinion that the Retirement Act was
enacted to meet a problem entirely foreign to that dealt with by the
Employers' Liability Act, and, consequently, that to allow such mitigation of damages as has been suggested would conflict with the intent
of Congress and the objects of the acts; that the intent of Congress
should prevail; and that to effectuate that intent the courts will be
justified in utilizing those arguments which serve that end, despite the
existence of equally logical arguments leading to the opposite result.
William H. Klein

88 Normal rules of contributory negligence were abrogated by the Employers'
Liability Act, 35 Stat. L. 66, § 3 (1908), 45 U. S. C. (1934), § 53.

